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No. 70-279
United States y. Florida East Coast Ry. Co.
Appeal from the USDC for MD Florida

This case; held for decision in No. 71-227, United States
y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., involves the Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad Co.
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Re: No. 70-279 U. S. v. Florida East
Coast Railway
Dear Bill:
a'

When you opinion is ready to be released, please note at
the end that I took no part in the coo.sideration or decisioo. of the
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

~n:prtmc

Qj:ottrt cf tltc ~Tuite~ .§tutc$

~a$lfingtmt.

;w. <.q:.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

RE: No. 70-279

January 3, 1973

United States v. Florida
East Coast Rail way

Dear Bill:

I agree.
Sincerely,
)

/
/

)

';

/- I( (
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

/

1'o : The Chief Just1ce
Mr. v .....r...., Lee Bron a.n
lfr. J dL .c cc &~.e\.ai~t
Mr. ,T . , c ilh• tG
Mr. z~~ . . c_ .ar~ha ll
u

Mr. Ju;;·"i''~ b:ac1..mu~
llr. Jus"Lico Per. wll
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Mr. Justice
From: Douc;J.a.G,

Reb~qui st
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated: _,__,
~ -,.-.,--

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND I:rjidiiculated:
J
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. FLORIDA
- - - -- EAST COAST RAILWAY CO. AND SEABOARD
COAST LINE RAILROAD CO.
ON APPEAL FROM 'l'HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 70- 279.

Decided November - , 1971

PEn CuRIAM.

The question is whether the Interstate Commerce
Commission procedures used in this rate case "for the
submission of . . . evidence in written form" avoided
prejudice to the appellees so as to comport with the requirements of § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act.'
The Government appeals from the District Court's order
remanding this case to the Commission for further proceedings on the incentive per diem rates to be paid by
1
In its relevant part, § 7 provides: "In rulo making ... an
agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form." 5 U. S. C. § 556 (d) (emphasis added).
Our decision in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp .,
ante, p. - , holding that § 7 of the Administra1ive Procedure Act
was inapplicable to certain rulcmaking procedures under § 1 (14) (a)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a), docs not
ar1ply to the fact s of this cnsc. In A/legheny-L11dlum, we dealt with
the Commission's general rulcmaking powers under the first sentence
of § 1 (14) (a). We held thnt such rulcmaking was not required to
be "on the record" under § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procerdure
Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553 (c), and that § 7, therefore, was inapplicable.
In the present case, by contrast, we deal with Commission incentive
per diem rulemaking under the 1966 amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act where Congress has conditioned Commission action
upon extensive fnctual inquiries and preconditions. In surh cases,
we conclude that Commission rulemaking was to be "on the record".
and that § 7 applies.
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the appellee railroads for the standard boxcars they use.
We affirm.
In 1966, Congress amended § 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act to require that the Commission
.investigate the use of methods of incentive compensation
to alleviate any shortage of freight cars "and encourage
the acquisition and maintenance of a car supply adequate
to meet the needs of commerce and the national defense."
49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a). While the Commission was
given the discretion to exempt carriers from incentive
payments "in the national interest," it was denied the
power to "make any incentive element applicable to any
type of freight car the supply of which the Commission
finds to be adequate . . . . " Ibid.
The Commission's initial investigation under this authority (31 Fed. Reg. 9240) was terminated without
action because it "produced no reliable information respecting the quantum of interim incentive charge necessary to meet the statutory standards." 332 I. C. C. 11,
16. A subsequent study of boxcar supply and demand
conditions (32 Fed. Reg. 20987) yielded data which were
compiled in an interim report containing tentative
charges and which were submitted to the railroads for
comment. 337 I. C. C. 183. Although the Commission
was admittedly uncertain whether its proposed charges
would accomplish the statutory objective, id., at 191,
and even though "the opportunity to present evidence
and arguments" was contemplated, id., at 183, congressional impatience militated against further delay in
implementing § 1 (14) (a). 2 Consequently, the Commission rejected the requests of the appellees and other
railroads for further hearings and promulgated an incentive per diem rate schedule for standard boxcars.
337 I. C. C. 217.
2
Sec Hearing:; Before the Subcommittee on Surface Tr:ln::;portation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 9lst Cong., l::;t Ses::; .
(1969) .
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Appellees then brought this action in the District
Court alleging that they were "prejudiced" within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act by the
Commission's failure to afford them a proper hearing.
Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 725
(MD Fla., 1971). Seaboard argued that it had been
damaged by what it alleged to be the Commission's
sudden change in emphasis from specialty to unequipped
boxcars and that it would lose some $1.8 million as the
result of the Commission's allegedly hasty and experimental action. Florida East Coast raised significant
challenges to the statistical validity of the Commission's
data 3 and also contended that its status as a terminating
railroad left it with a surfeit of standard boxcars which
should exempt it from the requirement to pay incentive
charges.
Appellees in other words argue that the inadequacy
of the supply of standard boxcars was not sufficiently
established by the Commission's procedures. Seaboard
contends that specialty freight cars have supplanted
standard boxcars and Florida East Coast challenges the
accuracy of the Commission's findings.
In its interim report, the Commission indicated that
there would be an "opportunity to present evidence and
arguments." The appellees could reasonably expect that
the later hearings would give them the opportunity to
substantiate and elaborate the criticisms they set forth
in their initial objections to the interim report. That
alone would not necessarily support the claim of "prejudice." But we conclude that "prejudice" was shown
3 Florida East Coast argues, for example, that the Commission's
finding of a boxcar shortage may be attributable to a variety of
sampling or definitional errors, asserting that it is unrealistic to.
define boxcar deficiencies in such a manner as "to show as a
'deficiency' the failure to supply a car on the day requested by the
shipper no matter when the request was received." The Go\·ernment's contention that a 24-hour standard was not used seems unresponsive to this argument. See 337 I. C. C., at 221.
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when it was claimed that the very basis on which the
Commission rested its finding was vulnerable because it
lacked statistical validity or other reasoned basis. In
that narrow group of cases we conclude that prejudice
for lack of a proper hearing is shown.
It is argued that Long Island R. Co. v. United States,
318 F. Supp. 490 (EDNY 1970), presents a conflict requiring plenary consideration of the present case. Both
Long Island and the present case involve challenges
to the Commission's procedures establishing incentive
per diem rates. In Long Island, however, the railroad
pointed to no specific challenges to the Commission's
findings (318 F. Supp., at 499) and the trial was conducted on stipulated issues involving the right to an
oral hearing. !d., at 491 n. 2. Since Long Island presented no information which might have caused the
Commission to reach a different result, 4 there was no
showing of prejudice and a fortiori no right to an oral
hearing. In the present case, by contrast, we have specific factual disputes and the issue is the narrow one of
whether written submission of evidence without oral
argument was prejudicial.
In the Long Island case the court, speaking through Judge
Friendly, said:
"Whether there was to be an oral hearing or not, the Long Island's
first job was to examine the basic data and find this out. Nothing
stood in its way. . . . If, on examining the data, the Long Island
had pointed to specifics on which it needed to cross-examine or
present live rebuttal testimony and the Commission had declined to
grant an oral hearing, we would have a different case. Instead the
Long Island's request for an oral hearing was silent as to any respect
in which the Commission's disclosure of greater detail or crossexamination of the Commission's staff was needed to enable it to
mount a more effective argument against the Commission's proposal.
The last sentence of § 556 (d) would be deprived of all meaning if
this were held sufficient to put the agency on notice that 'prejudice'
would result from the denial of an oral hearing. Even taking into
account the further representations that have been made to us, we
f:lil to see that prejudice has been established." 318 F. Supp., at 499 .
4
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In affirming the order of the District Court, we of
course intimate no views on the merits of the underlying
controversy.
Affirmed..
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting.
I do not doubt that if presented with the facts of this
case the three-judge court which decided Long Island R.
Co. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (EDNY 1970),
would have handed down a decision opposite to the one
we are now reviewing. I would note this case to determine which court is correct in its perception of the
obligations of the ICC.

~n.ptmu ~(lltrt ~1f tlrt> ~1tritd'r ..§tutes

'J)traslringtan, p. (!}.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

June fifth
1972

Dear Chief:
I talked with Bill Rehnquist and
he has not had sufficient time to study
No. 70-279 - u. s. v. Florida East Coast,
so I suggest it be put on the next
Conference List so that it can be explored
by the Conference and determined whether
it should be put down for oral argument or
disposed of summarily.
The new sentence that Bill Rehnquist
put into his Allegheny opinion (71-227)
eliminates any possibility of a conflict
with Florida East Coast.

O.Douglas

The Chief Justice
CC:

The Conference

.§u:vrttttt Q}cu:d cf ttrt 'J!Uritt~ ~tafug
'llagfrhtgtcn.IO. QJ. 2!l&t>!.2
CHAMBERS OF

June 6, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 70-279 -

u.s.

and

r.c.c.

v. Florida

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your
Sincerely,

~

rl.
ft-

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc:

Conference

curiam.
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United States et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for
v.
the Middle District of
Florida East Coast Railway
Florida.
Company et al.
[January-, 1973J

MR. JusTICI~ REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Appellees, t\vO railroad companies, brought this action
in the District Court of the Middle District of Florida
to set aside the incentive per diem rates established by
appellant Interstate Commerce Commission in a rulemaking proceeding. Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968,
Ex parte No. 252 (Sub No. 1). They challenged the
order of the Commission on both substantive and procedural grounds. The District Court sustained appellees' position that the Commission had failed to
comply "·ith the applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. ~ 551 et seq., and therefore set aside the order without dealing with the railways'
other contentions. The District Court held that the
language of ~ 1 (14) (a) 1 of the Interstate Commerce
'Section 1 (14) (a) providrs:
"The Commission mn~· , after hearing, on a complaint or upon
it.-; ow11 initiati,·c without complaint, e:;tabli~h rea~onablc rnlrs,
rrgulations, and practices with rcsprrt to cnr sen·irr hy common
rnrrirrs by railroad sub.irrt to 1hi ' rhaptrr, including 1he compensation to be paid and other terms of any ront rn ct, ngrermrn1 , or
a rrangcment. for the usc of any locomotive, car, or othrr \'Chicle
not owned by the ranier using it (and whether or noL ownrcl by
another carrier) , and the penalties or other sanctions for nonobscrv-

70-270-0 PINION
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UNITED

STATE~

Act, 40 U. S. C.

~

v. FLOHlDA EAST COAST R. CO.

1 (14)( a), required the Commission

in a proceeding such as this to act in accordance with
~

556 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S. C.
556 (d) and that the Commission's determination to
receive submissions from the appellees only in written
form 'ms a violation of that section because the respondents were "prejudiced" by that determination
within the meaning of that section.
}joJlo,Ying our decision last Term in United States v.
A ller;he11y-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742 ( 1972), we
noted probable jurisdiction. 407 U.S. 908 (Hl72), andrequested the parties to brief the question of whether the
Commission's proceeding was governed by 5 U.S. C.~ 553/
~

of ~neh rnlr~, rrgulal ion~, or praeticr~. In fixin~ ~1wh rompr••~a
tion to lw paid for thr n~r of an~· t~·pr of frright car, thr C<llnmi~~ion
:;lwll gi,·r ron~iclrration to thr n:ttion:d Jp,·rl of O\\'IWI'~hip ol' ~nrh
t~·pc of frright <·nr and to othrr f:trtor,; :1fl'rrting thr :tdrqnae.'· of
t hr national frl'ight ear ~nppl~·, and ~hall. on the ba~i~ of ~ueh con~idrm t ion, drt rrminr whrt hrr <·ornprn~n t ion ~hould hr eont pu 1Pd
;;olrl~· on thr ba~i~ of rlrmrut:; of O\\'nrr~hip rxprn~r ill\·oh·Pd in
O\\'lling and maintnining ~ueh t~·Jw of frpight car, including a f:tir
rrt Ill' II on Yalur, or whrthrr ~urh eomJWn~n 1ion ~hould br inrrrn~rd
h~· ;.:ueh inrPnti\'<' drmrnt or rlrnwnt:; of romprn~ntion a~ in thr
Commi~~ion'~ judgmrnt \\'ill pro,·idr ju;;t and rra:sonablr romprl•~a
tion to frright rar 0\\'IIN~, rontributr to ~ound ear ~rn·ier praeti<·r~
(including rffirirnt utiliwtion and di,;tribution of rnr~), nnd mroma~~:r thr nrqui~ition and mninlrnanrr ol' a r:tr ~uppl~· adrqt1:1tr to
mrrt thr nrrd~ of rommriTC' and thr n:1tionnl ddrn~<'. Thr Commi~~imt ~hall not makr any inrrnti,·r rlrmrnt :tpplie:tblr to :til,\' t~·1w
ol' l'rri~~:ht rar thr ~uppl~· ol' \\'hirh thr Cornmi~~ion find~ to be
:Hirqua t r a ncl m:t.\' rxrmpt from t lw comprn~:t t ion to lw ]):tid b~ ·
:tn~· group of rarrirr,; ~urh inernt j,·r rlrmrnt or rlrmPnt~ if thr
Commi~~ion find:-; it to lw in thr nntional intrrr~t."
"'·~ .558 Rulr mnking
"(:1) Thi~ ~rction nppli<'~. ar·r·ording to thr proYi~ion~ th<'l'rof,
rxcrpt to tlw rxtrnt that t hNr i~ im·oh·rd"(1) a milit:tr~· or forri~~:n afT:tir:-; fun<·tion of th<' (lnitPd Stnt<'~: or
'· (2) a matt C'l' rrb t ing to agrnr~· man:t~rnwnt or Jlf'r~onnrl or to
publi<· Jli'Oprrt,\·, lonn~. grant~, lwnrfit;;, or rontrart~.
''(b) Crnrr:tl notirr of propo~rd rnlr rna king ~h:tll br pub] i~hrd
aiH'C'

70-270-0PTNION
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or by ~~ 556" and 557.' of the Administrative Procedure 1\ct. 'Ve here decide that the Commission'
proceeding "·as govrrnecl only by ~ 553 of that Act,
in thr Frdrral Tirgi . <trr, unlrs~ prr.-<on~ subjret thrrrto arc namrd
nnd rit hrr prr~on:ill~· ~rr\'('CI or ot hrnri~r hnYr art tt:il not irr t hrrrof
in arrordnncr with law. Thr not icr shnll ineludc"(1) :1 ~tatrmrnt of thr timr, pi:IC'C', and nntmr of public ruh>
rna king procredings;
"(2) rdrrrnrr to the lrgal authorit~· undrr whieh thr rule is
propo ... rd: and
'·(:~) rithrr thr terms or ~ubst:mcr of thr proposrd rulr or a
dr:'cript ion of t hr ~ubjrct~ and is~ur" im·oh'ed.
"Excrpt when notirr or hr:1ring i~ rwptir<'d h~· ~tatute , thi~ subsection
dor" not a ppl~·'·(.\) to intrrpretnti,·r ru!r:', grnrral ~tntrmrnts of polir~·. or rulrs
of agrnr~· org:1nir.at ion, prorrdurc, or praetiee; or
"(B) whrn thr agerw~· for good cau~r finds (and inrorporntrs
t hr finding nnd a brirf st n trment of rra"ons t hrrrfor in t hr rulrs
i"~urd) that noti(·r nnd publie prorrdmr thrrron arr impr:1cticahlr,
unnN·c>.-<~ar~·. or rontmr~· to thr publir interest.
"(c) Aftrr notirr rcquirrd b~· thi~ srrtion, thr ngrnc~· 'hnll giw
int<•rc•,trd prr,;ons nn opportunit~· to pnrtic•ipntr in thr nt!r making
through ~ubmi""ion of writtrn dnta, ,·irw", or nrgumrnt~ with or
without oppor·ttmit~· for ornl prr"c·ntation. After ronsidrration of
thr rr]r,·ant mattrr prrsrntrd, thr agrnr~· shnll inrorporntr in thr
rulr~ :tdoptrd a conri~r stntrmrnt of thrir ba~i~ nnd pmpo~r. Whrn
mlr~ nrr rrquirrd b~· Htntulr to hr m:tdr on thr rrrord nftrr
opportuuit~· for nn agrrw~· hrnring, srrtions 51)(3 nne! 1)157 of this
tit lr fiJl]ll~ · instrnd of thi" suh~rct ion.
"(d) Thr rrquirrd pnblic·ntion or ~rn · irr of n suh~t:mti,·r rnlr
slwll hr mndr not Jr,-s than 00 dn~·~ hrforr il~ riTrrti,·c datr. rxrrpt" (1) a snb~t:tnti,·r rulr which gmnt~ or rrrognizcs :1n rxrmption
or rrl irYr~ a rr,-t rirt ion:
" (2) intrrprrtnt i,·r rnlr,.; and ~tntrmrnt~ of polir~· : or
" (0) n~ othrrwi,.;r proYidrd b~· thr :tgrnr~· for good c:lusr found
nnd puhti~hrd with 1hr rulr.
" (r ) Enrh agrnr~· shall gi,·r an intNr,.;trd per,;on lhr right to
prtit ion for t hr is,.;unnrr, nrnrndmrnt. or rrprnl of :1 rulr."
:l ''§Mo.
Hr:trings; prr~iding rmplo~·rr~: powrr~ and dnt ir~: hurdrn of proof: rvidrncr: rrcorcl as bn~i,.; of drri~ion
" (a) Thi,.; ,.;rrtion npplir ..;, arcording to thr pro,· i~ions thrrrof, 1o

rFootnole J, is on p. 51

70-279-0 [>J"XlO"X

4

UNITED RT.\.TES v. FLORID.\ F..\RT COAST R. CO.

and that appellees received the "hearing" required by
~ 1 (14)( a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and
llC'nring~ required b~· se('tion 5.'n or 554 of thi~ title to hr ronductrd
in accordance with thi~ ~eetion.
"(b) Thrre ~hall prr,-ide at theta king of l'l·idence"(1) the agenr~·:
'· (2) one or more member~ of the bod.1· whirh eompri~c·-< 1he
n~rnc~·; or
"(:'!) onr or more hearing rxaminers appointed under seetion
:nos of thi~ title.

''ThiH subchapter does not ~uprrsedr the condnrt of ~peeified classes
ol' proceeding~. in 11·holr or in part , b~· or before board~ or other emplo~·ers special!~· proYided for b~· or designatrd undN statute. The
fnnct ions of pre~;iding emplo~·ees and of emplo~·ee~ pa rtiripa t ing in
decisions in ncrordnnre with srction 557 of thi~ title shall be rondurted in an impartinl manner. A presiding or pnrticipating rmplo~·ee ma~· at an~· time disqualif~· himself. On the filing in good
fnith of a timel~· and :;uffieient affida1·it of ]1rr~onal bins or other
di~qnalification of a pre:;iding or participating rmplo~·ee, the agency
~hall determine the mattN as a part of thr rrcord and derision in the
cn~e.

''(c) Subject to published rules of the agenc~ · and within its JlOIYers,
employees pre:;iding at hearing:; ma~·,, (1) administer oaths and affirmations;
''(2) issue :;ubpenns authorized by law;
"en rulr on offers of proof and rrceive relevant evidence;
" ( 4) take depo~it ion:; or have depositions taken when 1he end::;
of jm;t ire would be ~rrvrd;
" ( 5) regul ate the cour~e of the hearing;
"(6 ) hold conferences for 1ht> settlement or simplicat ion of the
i~~ue;; b~· consent of the partie~;
"(7 ) dispose of procrclurnl requests or similar matter~;
'· (8) make or recommend decisions in :~rcordanre with ~ed ion
.5.37 of this title: and
"(9) take othN action authorized by agency rule consi~tent with
t hi~ Htbchapter.
"( d) Except as o1hcrwi~c providE'cl by statute, the pro]JOnrnt of a
rnl(' or orciN ha" the burden of proof. Any oral or documentar~· cvidrnee ma~' be received, but the agenr~· a~ a matter of polie~· ~ hall
pr01·ide for thr exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial , or undul~· repeti-

70-279-0 PlNIO~
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remand the case to that court for further consideration
of appellees' other contentions that were raised there but
which we do not decide.
tiou~

rvidence. A ~anrtion may not be impo~ed or rulr or order
rxcept on consiclcrat ion of thr \\'hole record or thosr parts
t hrreof cit rcl b~· a part~· and ~upport <•d b.'' a ml in nccordamr with 1hr
rrliablr, probntive, nnd substantinl evidrnce. A party is entitled
to preHent his cn!>e or drfen~r by oral or documrntar~· r1·idrncr, to
~ubmit rebuttnl evidrnrr, and to conduct such cro~~-rxaminat ion ns
ma~· br required for n full and true di::;do~urr of the factK In rulr
mnking or determining claim;; for monr~· or benefits or applications
for initial licrnse:; an ngrncy mn~·, whrn a party will not be prejudiced
thcrrb~·, adopt procedure~ for the submi~~ion of all or pnrt of the
rvidcnce in written form.
" (e) The transcript of tc~t imony nne! exhibits, together with nll
papers and rrqucsts filE'd in the procercling, constitute~ thr rxclusive
rrcord for decision in accordance with section 557 of this title and, on
payment of lnwfully pre::;cribecl costs, shall br mncle availnble to the
partie~.
When an agency cleci~ion rests on official notice of a
materinl fact not appearing in the evidence in the rrcorcl, a party is
<·ntitiE'd, on timrl~· request, to an opportunit~· to show the contrary."
1 "§ 557.
Initial deci~ions; conclusivenr~~; rrview b~· agrnc~·; submission~ b~· parties; content;,; of decision~; record
'' (n) Thi~ section applie~, nccording to the provision::; thereof, when
a henring is rrquired to be ronducted in arcordnnce with section
556 of this title.
''( b) When the agrncy did not preside at the reception of t hr rvidence , the prrsiding rmplo)·ee or, ill cases not ~ubject to srct ion 554
(d) of this title, an employee qualified to pre~idr at hearings pm::;unnt to sect ion 55G of thi~ title , shall initially decide the ca8e unlrss
the agrncy require~ , either in ~ pe c ific casrs or b~r general rule, the
rntire record to be certified to it for drcision. When the presiding
rmplo~·ee mnkes an initial clcci:sion, that drci ~ ion then become,.; the
deci::;ion of the agenc~· without fmther proceeding::; nnle~::; thrre i~ an
nppral to, or rrview on motion of, thr agrnc~· within time provided by
rulr. On nppral from or review of thr initial de ci::;ion , the ngrnry
ha ~ all the powrr::; which it would hn\'C' in mnking thr initial drcision except as it may limit the issttc~ on not ier or b~ · rule. When
thr ag<'Jte~· makes the de r ision wilhout IHtl·ing presiclrd at the
reeept ion of t hr evidence, the wrsiding rmplo~·ee or an emplo~·ee
<1ualifird to pre ~ ide at hearing~ pursuant to section 550 of thi,.; title
i~~urd
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BACKGH01IND OF CHnONIC FREIGHT CAn SHORTAGES

This case arises from the factual background of a
chronic freight car shortage on the Nation's railroads
which we described in United States v. Alleghe11y-Ludlum
Steel Corp., supm. Judge Simpson, writing for the District Court in this case, noted that "[fi or a number of
years portions of the nation have been plagued "·ith
seasonal shortages of freight cars in '"hich to ship goods."
322 F. Supp. 725, 726 (MD Fla. 1971). Judge Friendly,
writing for a three-judge district court in the Eastern
District of New York in the related case of Long Island
R. Co. v. Uniled Slates, 318 F. Supp. 490, 491 (EDNY
1970), described the Commission's order as "the latest
chapter in a long history of freight car shortages m
~hall fir~t rrrommrnd a deci~i ~m, rxcrpt that in rule mnking or
drtNmining npplirntion~ for initial lirrn~es''(1) in:;trad thrrrof thr ngrnr~· ma~· i~~ur a tentnti,·r dcri~ion
or onr of it~ re~pon~iblc cmplo~·rp~ ma~· rrromrnrnd a dcri~ion: or
'· (2) thi,; proerdurr ma~· hr omit trcl in a ra~r in which the agrnry
find~ on the rerord that clur and timrl~· rxrrution of it~ function,;
imperat i\·el_,. and unaYoiclably so I'C'(]Ilires.
" (r) Brfore a rreommrndrd, initial, or trntntin• drl· i~ion, or :1 drri~ion on ngrnr~· rr,·irw of tllC' deC'i~ion of ;;uborclinnte rmplo~· rrs, the
partir,; arr rntit!Pd to a rrm;onablr opportunit.\· to Rnbmit for thr rcn;;idNation of thr rmplo~·rrs participating in the derisions.. (1) propo~rcl finding~ and eonrlu~ions; or
·· (2) rxrrptions to thr dcriHion~ or rrrommrndrd drri~ions of
suhorclinatr emplo~· rrs or to trntat in' agPmoy drei~ion~: nnd
"'(:3) supporting rrnsons for 1hr rxrrptions or propo~rd findings
or ronrlnsionR.

"The rrrord shall E<how ihr ruling on raeh finding, ronrlu~ion, or
rxrrption prr~rntrd. All drciRiOll~ , including in it in!, rrromml•ndrd,
and trntativr drci~ion~ , arr a part of thr rreord :1nd ~hnll inrlnclr a
R1ntrmrnt of"(A) findings and conclu ::; ion~. and thr rrnRon~ or bn~i~ thrrefor, on all thr matrrinl i~~urs of fnrt, law, or di~rrrtion prr~rntrd
on t hr rrrord ; and
" (B) the appropriate rulr, ordrr. sanrticm, rrlirf or drninl thrrrof."
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certain regions and seasons and of attempts to ease
them." Congressional concern for the problem was manifested in the enactment in 1066 of an amendment to
~ 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, enlarging
the Commission's authority to pre cribe per diem charges
for the use by one railroad of freight cars owned by
another. Pub. L. 89- 430. 80 Stat. 168. The Senate
Committee on Commerce stated in its report accompany1 ng this legislation:
"Car shortage , which once were confined to the
Mid-\Vest during harvest seasons. have become increasingly more frequent, more severe. and nationwide in scope as the national freight car supply has
plummeted." S. Rep. No. 386. 80th Cong. , 1st Sess.,
pp. 1-2.
The Commission in 1966 commenced an investigation
Ex parte No. 252, Incentive Per Diem Charges, "rtJo
determine whether information presently available warranted the establishment of an incentive element increase,
on an interim basis. to apply pending further study and
investigation." 332 I. C. C. 11. 12 (1967). Statements
of position were received from the Commission staff
and a number of railroads. Hearings were conducted
at which witnesses were examined. In October 1967, the
Commission rendered a decision discontinuing the earlier
proceeding. but announcing a program of further investigation into the general subject.
In December 1967, the Commission initiated the rulemaking procedure giving rise to the order which appellees
here challenge. It directed Class I and Class II linehaul railroads to compile and to report detailed information with respect to freight car demand and supply
at numerous sample stations for selected days of thc
week during 12 four-\veek periods beginning January 29,
1968.
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Some of the affected railroads voiced questions about
the proposed study or requested modification in the study
procedures outlined by the Commission in its notice of
proposed rulemaking. In response to petitions setting
forth these carriers' views, the Commission staff held
an informal conference in April 1968, at which the
objections and proposed modifications were discussed.
Twenty railroads. including appellee Seaboard, were rC'presented at this conference, at which the Commission's
staff sought to answer questions about reporting methods
to accommodate individual circumstances of particular
railroads. The conference adjourned on a note that undoubtedly left the impression that hearings would be
held at some future date. A detailed report of the conference was sent to all parties to the proceeding before
the Commission.
The results of the information thus collected were
analyzed and presented to Congress by the Commission
during a hearing before the Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation of the Senate Committee on Commerce
in May 1969. Members of the Subcommittee expressed
dissatisfaction with the Commission's slow pace in exercising the authority which had been conferred upon it
by the 1966 Amendments to the Interstate Commerce
Act. Judge Simpson in his opinion for the District
Court said:
"Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation expressed considerable dissatisfaction
with the Commission's apparent inability to take
effective steps towards eliminating the national
shortage of freight cars. Comments were general
that the Commission was conducting too many
hearings and taking too little action. Senators
pressed for more action and less talk, but Commission counsel expressed doubt respecting the Commission's statutory power to act without additional
hearings." 322 F. Supp., at 727.
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Judge Friendly, describing the same event in Long
Island R. Co. v. United States, supra, said:
"To say that the presentation was not received
with enthusiasm would be a considerable understatement. Senators voiced displeasure at the Commission's long delay at taking action under the 1966
Amendment, engaged in some merriment over what
was regarded as an unintelligible discussion of
methodology . . . and expressed doubt about the
need for a hearing . . . . But the Commission's general counsel insisted that a hearing was needed .. .
and the Chairman of the Commission agreed .... "
318 F. Supp., at 494.
The Commission, now apparently imbued with a new
sense of mission, issued in December 1969 an interim
report announcing its tentative decision to adopt incentive per diem charges on standard box cars based on
the information compiled by the railroads. The substantive decision reached by the Commission was that
so-called "incentive" per diem charges should be paid
by any railroad using on its lines a standard box car--L
owned by another railroad. Before the enactment of l
the 1966 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
it was generally thought that the Commission's authority to fix per diem payments for freight car use was
limited to setting an amount that reflected fair return
on investment for the owning railroad, without any
regard being had for the desirability of prompt return
to the owning line or for the encouragement of additional purchases of freight cars by the railroads as a
method of investing capital. The Commission concluded
however, that in view of the 1966 amendment it could
impose additional "incentive" per diem charges to spur
prompt return of existing cars and to make acquisition
of new cars financially attractive to the railroads. It
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did so by means of a proposed schedule that established
such charges on an across-the-board basis for all common
carriers by railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act. Embodied in the report was a proposed rule adopting the Commission's tentative conclusions and a notice
to the railroads to file statements of position within 60
days. couched in the following language:
"That verified statements of facts, briefs. and statements of position respecting the tentative conclusions
reached in the said interim report, the rules and
regulations proposed in the Appendix to this order,
and any other pertinent matter, are hereby invited
to be submitted pursuant to the filing schedule set
forth belmY by any interested person whether or not
such person is already a party to this proceeding.
"That any party requesting oral hearing shall set
forth with specificity the need therefor and the evidence to be adduced." 49 CFR § 1036.
Both appellee rail\\"ays filed statements objecting to
the Commission's proposal and requesting an oral hearing, as did numerous other railroads. In April 1970, the
Commission , without having held further "hearings,"
issued a supplemental report, making some modifications in the tentative conclusions earlier reached. but
overruling in toto the requests of appellees Seaboard
uncl Florida East Coast.
The District Court held that in so doing the Commission violated ~ 556 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. and it was on this basis that it set aside
the order of the Commission.

II.

APPLLCADILITY OF ADniiNISTTIATIYE PROCEDL' HE AcT

In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Si<'el Corp.,
supra, we held that the language of ~ 1 (14)(a) of the
Int0rstate Commerce Act authorizing the Commis-
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sion to act "after hearing" was not the equivalent of a
requirement that a rule be made "on the record after
opportunity_~· . an agency hearing" as the la.tter term
is used in ~ 5(J3 (c) of the AdministratiYe Procedure Act.
Since the 1966 amendment to ~ 1 (14)(a), under which
tho Commission was hero proceeding. does not by its
terms add to the hearing requirement contained in the
earlier language, tho same result should obtain here
unless that amendment contains language that is tantamount to such a requirement. Appellees contend that
such language is found in the provisions of that Act
requiring that:
"The Commission shall give consideration to the
national level of ownership of such type of freight
car and to other factors affecting the adequacy of
this national freight car supply, and shall. on the
basis of such consideration. determine whether compensation should be computed .... "
While this language is undoubtedly a mandate to the
Commission to consider tho factors there set forth in
roaching any conclusion as to imposition of per diem
incentive charges, it adds to the hearing requirements
of tho section neither expressly nor by implication. We
know of no reason to think that an administrative agency
in reaching a decision cannot accord consideration to
factors such as those set forth in the HJ66 amendment
by means other than a trial-type hearing or tho presentation of oral argument by the affected parties. Congress
by that amendment specified necessary components of
the ultimate decision, but it did not specify tho method
by which tho Commission should acquire information
about those components. 5
r. Tho Court of .\ppcnb for the ?\inth Circuit rr:tC'hrd a rr~ ult
~imilar

to that which we rcach in Pacific Coast European Conference v. U11iled States, 350 F. 2d 197 ( 1905). Con~truing tho
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Both of the district courts which reviewed this orderof the Commission concluded that its proceedings were
governed by the stricter requirements of ~ ~ 556 and
557 of the AdministratiYe Procedure Act rather than
by the provisions of ~ 553 alone.n The conclusion of
the District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
which we here review, was based on the assumption
that the language in § 1 ( 14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act requiring rulemaking under that section to
be done "after hearing" was the equivalent of a statutory
requirement that the rule "be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing." Such an assumption is inconsistent with our decision in AlleghenyLudlum, supra.
The District Court for the Eastern District of K ew
York reached the san1c conclusion by a somewhat different line of reas011ing. That court felt that because
§ 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act had required a "hearing," and because that section 'vas originally enacted in Hl17, Congress was probably thinking
in terms of a "hearing" such as that described in the
authorit~· of the Federal l\Inritime Commi:s:sion under § l..Jb of the
Rhipping Act of 1916, a~ amended, 46 U. S. C. § 81:3a (Supp. V,
1064) , that court observed that " . . . the authority of thr l'ommi~~ion lo permit :such contract~ wa:s limited by rcquirinp: that the
contr:1rt~ in eight specified rc~prct::; mcrt thr Congre~~ional judgmrnt a:; to what the~· i-ihoulcl includr." 350 F. 2cl, at 201. Xotwit h~tnnding these explicit tlirrction~ that parti cu lar factor~ be
r•on~iclerrcl by thr Commis~ion in rcac·hing it:; cleci~ion thl' court
hrld that the stat ute':; rrquirrment s of " notice and hearing'' Wl're
not ~ufficicnt to bring into pia~· thr provi,.;ions of §§ 55() :mel 557
of the AclminiRt rntive Procrclurc Act.
6 Both district
court opinions wrrc handrcl down beforr our
rlcci:;ion in United States Y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., and it
appear::; from thr record before us that thr Governmrnt in those
court::; did not rrnlly contr:;t the propo~it ion that thr Commi~~ion's
proccrdings Wl'rl' p:overnecl b~· ihr ~trictcr stnndarcl~ of §§ 556
nnd 557.
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opinion of this Court in the roughly contemporaneous
case of ICC v. Louisville & }.'ashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 93 (1913). The ingredients of the "hearing" were
there said to be that "all parties must be fully apprised
of the evidence submitted or to be considered. and must
be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documellts. and to offer evidence in explanation
or rebuttal." Combining this view of congressional
understanding of the terms "hearing" with comments
by the Chairman of the Commission at the time of the
adoption of the 1966 legislation regardi11g the necessity
for "hearings," that court concluded that Congress had
in effect required that these proceedings be "on the
record after an opportunity for agency hearing" within
the meaning of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act.
Insofar as this conclusion is grounded on the belief
that the language "after hearing" of§ 1 (14)(a) without
more would trigger the applicability of §§ 556 and 557,
it, too, is contrary to our decision in Allegheny-Ludlum,
supra. The District Court observed that it was "rather
hard to believe that the last sentence of § 553 (c) was
directed only to the few legislative sports where the
words 'on the record' or their equivalent had found their
way into the statute book." 318 F. Supp., at 496. This
is, however, the language which Congress used, and
since there are statutes on the books that do use these
very words, see, e. g., the Fulbright Amendment to the
Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U. S. C. § 43a, and 21 U. S. C.
§ 371 (e) (3), the regulations provision of the Food and
Drug Act, adherence to that language cannot be said
to render the provision nugatory or ineffectual. We
recognized in Allegheny-Ludlum that the actual words
"on the record" and "after ... hearing" used in § 553
were not words of art, and that other statutory language
having the san1.e meaning could trigger the provisions
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of ~~ 556 and 557 in rulemaking proceedings. But we
adhere to our conclusion expressed in that case that
the phrase "after hearing" in ~ 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act does not have such an effect.
III. "HEARING" REQUIREl\mNT OF ~ 1 (14) (a)
IwrEHSTATE CoMMERCE AcT

OF

THE

Inextricably intertwined with the hearing requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act in this case
is the meaning to be given to the language "after
hearing" in ~ 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Appellees both here and in the court below contend that
the Commission procedure here fell short of that required by the "hC'aring'' rC'quiremC'nt of§ 1 (14)(a), even
though it may have satisfied ~ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Administrative Procedure Act
states that none of its provisions "limit or repeal additional requirements in1posed by statute or oth0rwisc
recognized by law." 5 U.S. C. ~ 559. Thus even though
the Commission 'vas not required to comply with § § 536
and 557 of that Act, it was required to accord the "hearing" specified in § 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act. Though the District Court did not pass on this
contention, it is so closely related to the claim based on
the Administrative Procedure Act that we proceed to
decide it now.
If we were to agree with the reasoning of the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York with respect
to the type of hearing required by the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission's action might well violate
those requirements, even though it "·as consistent with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The term "hearing" in its legal context undoubtedly
has a host of meanings. 7 Its meaning undoubtedly \\'ill
7

8('(' 1

D:11·i~, Admini~1ra1iH'

Law

Trr•:di~r.

§H05 (195S).
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vary depending on \Yhether it is used in the context of
a rulemaking type proceedillg or in the context of a
11roceeding devoted to the adjudication of particular
disputed facts. It is by no means apparent what the
drafters of the Esch Car Service Act of HJ17, 40 Stat.
101, which became the first part of ~ 1 (14) (a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. meant by the term. Such
an intent v.-ould surely be an ephemeral one, if indeed
Congress in 1917 had in mind anything more specific
than the language it actually used, for none of the
parties refer to any legislative history which would shed
light on the intended meaning of the words "after
hearings." What is apparent, though, is that the term
was used in granting authority to the Commi~::sion to
make rules and regulations of a prospective nature.
Appellees refer us to testimony of the Chairman of
the Commission to the effect that if the added authority
ultimately contained in the 1966 amendment "·ere
enacted, the Commission vvould proceed with "great
caution" in imposing incentive per diem rates, and to
statements of both Commission personnel and Members
of Congress as to the necessity for a "heari11g" before
Commission action. Certainly the lapse of time of more
than three years between the enactment of the 1966
amendment and the Commission's i~::suance of its tentative conclusions cannot be said to evidence any lack
of caution on the part of that body. Nor do generalized
references to the necessity for a hearing advance our
inquiry, since the statute by its terms requires a "hearing"; the more precise inquiry of whether the hearing
requirements nece~::sarily include submission of oral
testimony. cross-examination, or oral arguments is not
resolved by such comments as these.
Under these circumstances, confronted with a grant
of substantive authority made after the Administrative

70-279-0PI~IO?\

Hi

UNITED STATES v. FLOHIDA EAST COAST

n.

CO.

Procedure Act was enacted/ we think that reference to
that Act, in which Congress devoted itself exclusively to
questions such as the nature and scope of hearings, is a
satisfactory basis for cletermiuing what is meant by the
term "hearing" used in another statute. Turning to
that act. we are convinced that the term "hearing'' as
used therein does not necessarily embrace either the
right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine
opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument
to the agency's decisionmaker.
Section 553 excepts from its requirements rulemaking
devoted to "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or
practice." and rulemaking "when an agency for good
cause finds ... that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest." This exception does not apply, however. "when
notice or hearing is required by statute"; in those cases,
even though interpretative rulemaking be involved, the
requirements of § 553 apply. But since thePe requirements themselves do not mandate any oral presentation,
see Allegheny-Ludlum, supra, it cannot be doubted that
a statute that requires a "hearing" prior to rulemaking
may in some circumstances be satisfied by procedures
which meet only the standards of ~ 553. The Court's
opinion in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U. S. 33 ( HH34), supports such a broad definition of the term "hearing."
Similarly, even where the statute requires that the
rulemaking procedure take place "on the record after
8

The

Inter~tate

Commrrre Act was mnendrd in May 1966; the
Procedure Act wa~ si~nificantl~· amended in Srpiember 1966, but the section detailing the rwoccclurr,; to be u~C'cl in
rulcmaking is ;;ubstantinlly similar to the original pro\· i~ioll in the
1946 Admini~t rative Procedure Act. Ser Pub. L. 70-·10 ~. 60

Admini~trativc

Stat. 238.
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opportunity for an agency hearing," thus triggering the
applicability of § 556, subsection d provides that the
agency may proceed by the submission of all or part
of the evidence in written form if a. party will not be
"prejudiced thereby." Again the Act makes it plain
that a specific statutory mandate that the proceedings
take place on the record after hearing may be satisfied in
some circumstances by evidentiary submission in written
form only.
We think this treatment of the term "hearing'' in the
Administrative Procedure Act affords a sufficient basis
for concluding that the requirement of a "hearing" contained in § 1 (14)(a), in a situation where the Commission was acting under the 1966 statutory rulemaking
authority which Congress had conferred upon it, did not
by its ovvn force require the Commission either to hear
oral testimony, to permit cross-examination of Commission witnesses, or to hear oral argument. Here the
Commission promulgated a tentative draft of an order,
and accorded all interested parties 60 days in which
to file stutements of position, submissions of evidence,
and other relevant observations. The parties had fair
notice of exactly what the Commission proposed to do,
and were given an opportunity to comment, to object,
or to make some other form of written submission. The·
fin al order of the Commission indicates that it gave consideration to the statements of the two appellees here.
Given the "open-ended" nature of the proceedings, and
the Commission's announced willingness to consider proposals for modification after operating experience had
been acquired, we think the hearing requirement of
§1(14)(a) of the Act was met.
Appellee railroads cite a number of our previous decisions dealing in some manner with the right to a hearing
in an administrative proceeding. Although appellees
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have asserted no claim of constitutional deprivation in
this proceeding, some of the cases they rely upon expressly speak in constitutional terms, while others are
less than clear as to whether they depend upon the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution, or upon generalized principles of
administrative law formulated prior to the adoption of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Morgan v. Uniled States, 304 U. S. 1 ( 1938), is cited
in support of appellees' contention that the Commission's proceedings were fatally deficient. That opinion
describes the proccedi ngs there involved as "quasi-judicial." id., at 14, aucl thus presumably distinct from a
rulemaking proceeding such as that engaged in by the
Commission here. But since the order of the Secretary
of Agriculture there challenged did involve a form of
ratcmaking. the case bears e11ough resemblance to the
facts of this case to warrant further examination of
appellees' contention. The administrative procedure in
Morgan was held to be defective primarily because the
persons who were to be affected by the Secretary's order
·were found not to have been adequately apprised of
what the Secretary proposed to do prior to the time
that he actually did it. Illustrative of the Court's reasoning is the following passage from the opinion:
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right
to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party
and to meet them. The right to submit argument
implies that opportu11.ity; otherwise the right may
be but a barren one. Those \vho are brought into
contest with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities arc
entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposal
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304 U. S., at

The proceedings before the Secretary of Agriculture
had been initiated by a notice of inquiry into the reasonableness of the rates in question, and the individuals
being regulated suffered throughout the proceeding from
its essential formlessness. The Court concluded that this
formlessness denied the individuals subject to regulation
the "full hearing'' \\'hich the statute had provided.
Assuming arguendo that the statutory term "full hearing" docs not differ significantly from the hearing requirement of ~ 1 (14)(a), we do not believe that the
proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission before us suffer from thr defect found to be fatal in
Morgan. Though the initial JJoticc of the proceeding
by no means set out in detail what the Commission
proposed to do, its tentative conclusions and order of
December 1960. could scarcely have been more explicit
or detailed. All interested parties '"ere given 60 days
following the issuance of these tentative findings and
order in which to make appropriate objections. Appellees were "fairly advised" of rxactly 'vhat the Commission proposed to do sufficiently in advance of the
entry of the final order so as to give them adequate
time to formulate and to present objections to the Commission's proposal. Morgan, therefore, docs not aid
appellees.
ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88
(1913), involved what the Court there described as a
"quasi-judicial" proceeding of a quite different nature
"Thi~ ~anw lanp;uagr wa~ ritrcl with :t]lpro,·nl b~· t hr Court in
lf'ilner Y. Committee on Clwrarter, :37:3 U. S. 9G, 105 (1963), in
whieh it was hPid thnt an applir:mt for ndmi~sion to thr bar could
not be clenircl sneh ndmi~~ion on t hP ba~i~ of ex parte ~tatemrnts of
other~ whozn he had I!Ot brrzz nffonkd nn O]lportunif.l' to crossrxnminr.
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than the one we review here. The provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, and of the Hepburn Act. 34 Stat. 584. in eHect at the time that case
was decided left to the railroad carriers the "primary
right to make rates," 227 U. S., at 92, but granted to
the Commission the authority to set them aside if after
hearing they were shmvn to be unreasonable. The proceeding before the Commission in that case had been
instituted by the Ke"· Orleans Board of Trade complaining that certain class and commodity rates charged by
the Louisville and Kashvllle Railway from l\ew Orleans
to other points were unfair, unreasonable, and discriminatory. 227 U. S .. at 90. The type of proceeding there,
in which the Commission adjudicated a complaint by a
shipper that specified rates set by a carrier were unreasonable, was sufficiently diHerent from the nationwide
incentive payments ordered to be made by all railroads in this proceeding so as to make the Louisville &
Nashville opinion inapplicable in the case presently
before us.
The basic distinction between rulemaking and aclj udication is illustrated by this Court's treatment of two
related cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Londoner v. Denver, cited in
oral argument by appellees, 210 U. S. 373 ( 1908). the
Court held that clue process had not been accorded a
landowner who objected to the amount assessed against
his land as its share of the benefit resulting from the
paving of a street. Local procedure had accorded him
the right to file a written complaint and objection, but
not to be heard orally. This Court held that due process
of law required that he "have the right to support his
allegations by argument however brief, and , if need be,
by proof, however informal." !d., at 386. But in the
later case of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board
of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441 (1915), the Court held
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that no hearing at all was constitutionally required prior
to a decision by state tax officers in Colorado to increase
the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by
a substantial percentage. The Court distinguished Londoner by stating that there a small number of persons
"were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds." 239 U. S. 445, 446.
Later decisions have continued to observe the distinction adverted to in Bi-Metallic Investment Co., supra.
In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 304--305· ( 1937). the Court noted
the fact that the administrative proceeding there involved was designed to require the utility to refund
previously collected rate charges. The Court held that
in such a proceeding the agency could not, consistently
with due process, act on the basis of undisclosed evidence
which was never made a part of the record before
the agency. The case is thus more akin to Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., supra. than it is to this case. FCC v.
WJR, 337 U. S. 265 (1949), established that there was
no across-the-board constitutional right to ora] argument in an:v administrative proceeding regardlf'ss of
its nature. While the line dividing them may not nlways
be a bright one. these decisions represent a recognized
distinction in administrative law between proceedings
for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or
standArdF:. on the one hand. and proceedings designed
to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the
other.
Here the incentive payments proposed by the Commission in its tentative order, and later adopted in its
final order, were a.pp1icable across the board to aU of
the common carriers by railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. No effort was made to single
out any particular railroad for special considrration based
on its own peculiar circumstances. Indeed. one of the
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objections of appellee Florida East Coast was that it
and other terminating carriers should have been treated
differently from the generality of the railroads. But
the fact that the order may in its effects have been
thought more disadvantageous by some railroads than
by others docs not change its generalized nature. Though
the Commission obviously relied on factual inferences
as a basis for its order, the source of these factual
inferences "·as apparent to anyone who read the order
of December 1969. The factual inferences were used
in the formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for prospective application only, rather than in
adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts.
The Commission's procedure satisfied both the provisions of § 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act
and of the Administrative Procedure Act, and were not
inconsistent 'vith prior decisions of this Court. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court.
and remand the case so that it may consider those contentions of the parties which are not disposed of by
this opmwn.

